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Abstract 
Cognitive dissonance causes people to rationalize actions that differ from their own 
preferences. Conformity, on the other hand, causes people to change their behavior as a 
result of pressure from others.  This paper investigates the consequences of preference 
dynamic that occur when individuals rationalize their preferences, are conformists and 
have a minimum consumption constraint. The main results are: (1) Individuals who have 
a greater tendency toward conformity will rationalize their preferences to a greater 
degree, (2) Individuals' optimal consumption pattern will be unstable and scatter over 
time, (3) Average consumption in society will increase along a cyclical path and (4) An 
increase in either cognitive dissonance or conformity induces greater volatility of average 
consumption.  
JEL classification: D90, E32, E37 
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1  Introduction: 
People tend to rationalize their behavior — they try to convince themselves that 
their actions are good. This phenomenon is captured by Leon Festinger’s  (1957) theory 
of  cognitive dissonance. The theory states that humans have a powerful motive to 
maintain cognitive consistency, a state of mind in which one’s beliefs, attitudes, and 
behavior are all compatible with each other (Abelson et al., 1968). Cognitive dissonance 
theory predicts that under certain circumstances, people change their attitudes so as to be 
consonant with their actual or past behavior. A person holding two conflicting cognitions 
will experience cognitive dissonance, an unpleasant state of tension akin to hunger or 
thirst. He will then wish to change one of his cognitions in such a way that both 
cognitions no longer conflict. When attitudes toward a behavior state that the behavior 
should be different than the behavior already enacted, a person might likewise suffer 
from cognitive dissonance and consequently alter his attitudes in such a way that they 
will coincide with behavior. One implication of this process for economic theory is that 
an agent who does not act according to his utility function might alter his utility function 
to accord with his behavior. A theory of endogenous preference formation can thus be 
derived from cognitive dissonance theory. Bowles (1998) reviewed endogenous 
preferences and claims that cognitive dissonance can provide an explanation for how 
economic circumstances induce new preferences. We assume that individuals' 
preferences vary over time because individuals tend to experience cognitive dissonance 
when their actions differ from their beliefs. Preferences in each period are thus derived 
according to realizations of actions in the previous period.    3
In the following model, we consider a group of individuals in a multi-period 
setting where each individual has to allocate resources in each period between two goods. 
One of the goods i s a normal good while the other is a "psychological good". By a 
"psychological good" we mean that individuals are simultaneously subject to three 
psychological phenomena in relation to consumption of that good. They might experience 
cognitive dissonance and rationalize their preferences regarding the consumption level of 
that good, they might be conformist in relation to the group’s average consumption of the 
psychological good and they might have a Subjective Minimum Consumption Constraint 
(hereafter SMCC). We investigate how these three psychological phenomena influence 
resource allocation between the two goods1. 
Much evidence regarding cognitive dissonance theory has been collected. 
According to Gilad, Kaish and Loeb (1987) more than 900 studies were conducted up to 
1982. Two seminal experiments are those of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), who 
showed that when people lie in situations where dissonance is aroused, individuals tend 
to believe their own lies, and of Freedman (1965), who showed that when children are 
mildly threatened not to act in a certain manner, they produce more behavior change than 
when they are severely threatened. The reason for this response is that a mild threat does 
not produce sufficient  deterrence, causing behavior to be rationalized by a change in 
attitudes. An experiment that relates to consumption was conducted by Middlestaedt 
(1969), in which student volunteers were asked to rank 9 swimsuits. When given a choice 
between their third- and fourth-ranked choice or between their third- and fifth-ranked 
                                                                   
1 In the chapter we focus on a microeconomic model of consumption but we believe the model can be 
useful for understanding general decision making that have the ingredients of rationalization, conformity 
and a lower boundary for the decision level. For example, allocation of time between two activities.   4
choice, the choice between the third and the fourth choice produced more dissonance than 
did a choice between the third and fifth choice because it required rejecting a more 
desirable alternative (that is, the fourth versus the fifth choice). The choice's rejection 
thus demanded some cognitive explanation. Afterwards, all volunteers were given the 
choice between their second and third choices. Those in the high dissonance group were 
more apt to choose their third choice over their second. The experiment showed that 
consumers who experience cognitive dissonance after buying a product enhance the 
utility of the product bought.  
Conformity is a common social-psychological phenomenon. Aronson (1999) 
defined conformity "as a change in a person's behavior or opinions as a result of real or 
imagined pressure from a person or group of people."  Classic studies include those of 
Sherif (1936) who showed that different answers given by individuals converge to a 
single answer when the individuals are  in a group. Asch (1951) showed that subjects 
consciously give wrong answers in order to conform to group norms. Economic models 
include Akerlof (1980) who finds that social customs that are disadvantageous to the 
individual may persist. Bernheim (1994) provides an economic model of conformity and 
explains the fact that standards of behavior govern some activities and not others. We 
assume that individuals are conformist in relation to the group average consumption of 
the psychological good. When the group average consumption of the psychological good 
increases (decreases), individuals want to increase (decrease) their consumption. 
Conformity is a force that causes people to want to consume as much as others, not more.   5
The assumption that individuals have a SMCC with respect to consumption of the 
psychological good can be justified by assuming loss aversion and status quo bias with 
respect to consumption of that good2. That is, they become accustomed to their 
consumption level. If consumption deteriorates below the current level, individuals lose 
with respect to their current status quo and incur a relatively high cost [see Rabin (1998) 
and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1992) for a detailed analysis of loss aversion and 
status quo bias]. 
We incorporated cognitive dissonance into our model by assuming that in each 
period, actual consumption is a random variable distributed around optimal consumption. 
In each period, there is some probability that cognitive dissonance will arise and the 
individual will alter his utility function in such a way that optimal consumption in the 
following period will equal actual consumption in the current period. In the next period, 
he will act according to his new, altered, utility function. Individuals’ preferences are 
therefore endogenously determined and evolve over time. Conformity is implemented by 
assuming that each individual incurs an increasing cost the farther  his consumption is 
from society’s average consumption
3. The SMCC is implemented by assuming that each 
individual will incur a high cost if there is a sudden large decrease in his consumption 
level.  
                                                                   
2 Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1999) analyzed the impact of minimum consumption requirement on the rate 
of economic growth and the evolution of wealth distribution. Black and Perold (1992) studied minimum 
consumption constraints in the context of insurance.  
3 By society we mean the group of individuals in the model.    6
The dynamic proposed in this paper includes maximization of a utility function as 
an element of a dynamic which also include cognitive dissonance, in contrast to other 
papers that model cognitive dissonance as a factor in a utility function [Akerlof and 
Dickens (1982), Dickens (1986), Nagler (1993), Rabin (1994), Montgomery (1994)]. 
Because economists usually model decision-making behavior by maximizing a utility 
function, this paper might be seen as diverging from classic economic theory. Utility 
maximization is a technique that balances the forces for and against consumption of 
psychological and non-psychological goods. We assume here that the magnitude of those 
forces is decided by cognitive dissonance.  
Cycles of average consumption for a group of individuals are derived from the 
assumptions stated above. Consider an individual’s consumption of the psychological 
good. When optimal consumption is not close to his SMCC, actual consumption is 
distributed symmetrically around the optimal level. Cognitive dissonance causes 
consumption to "scatter" over time because some individuals rationalize for more 
consumption while others rationalize for less consumption. Society’s expected average 
consumption of the psychological good does not change as we consider consumption 
farther into the future. Because individual consumption scatters over time, some 
individual’s consumption will eventually reach his SMCC. When someone's consumption 
is sufficiently close to his SMCC, his actual consumption is not distributed symmetrically 
around his optimal consumption: He  tends to consume and rationalize primarily for 
consumption above his optimal consumption. At this point, on average, the individual 
increases his consumption. This response causes society’s average consumption of the 
psychological good to increase. Conformity, the propagation mechanism in the model,   7
causes all individuals to increase consumption of the psychological good and induce a 
period of such a tendency. Society’s average consumption of the psychological good will 
thus increase still further. The increase in society’s average consumption of the 
psychological good will be greater the more individuals reach their SMCC 
simultaneously. Following the increase, all individuals will be farther away from their 
SMCC. Hence, consumption will scatter while expected average consumption of the 
psychological good will remain unchanged until the  consumption of  one or  more 
individuals again reaches their SMCC and another increase will then occur. We call such 
increases in society’s average consumption of the psychological good booms. Society’s 
average consumption of the psychological good increases due to booms that occur every 
few periods. Because society’s average consumption of the psychological good increases 
due to booms during some periods and is relatively constant during others, cycles will 
prevail.  
We assume a budget constraint.  When consumption of the psychological good 
increases, other things being equal, consumption of the non-psychological good 
decreases. We further assume that there is exogenous productivity growth in each period 
that causes, other things being equal, consumption of both goods to increase. Exogenous 
productivity growth together with the dynamic described in the previous paragraph can 
cause consumption of the psychological good to increase without a need for consumption 
of the non-psychological good to decrease.  
This paper follows several other economic papers incorporating the psychological 
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance into economic theory. This stream in the literature 
was initiated by Hirschman (1965), who used cognitive dissonance to describe attitude   8
change regarding modernization. Akerlof and Dickens (1982) considered a formal model 
of the implications of cognitive dissonance on workers in hazardous industries. 
Specifically, such workers would suffer from cognitive dissonance and convince 
themselves that the industry where they were working was safe. If safety equipment were 
to become available in the future, they would not purchase it. A Pareto inferior outcome 
would result whenever safety equipment was inexpensive relative to the cost of an 
accident. Dickens (1986) showed that increasing punishment could increase the crime 
rate. When punishment is mild, potential criminals who decided not to commit a crime 
rationalized their action by convincing themselves that there was no benefit from 
committing the crime. In the future, they would not commit a crime even when there was 
no punishment. When punishment is severe, no rationalization takes place because 
potential criminals have sufficient justification — the punishment — for not committing 
the crime. Gilad, Kaish and Loeb (1987) described a model where cognitive dissonance 
generates an information filter that blocks the flow of information when a discrepancy 
appears between new and old information. Hence, not all information reached the 
decision-maker. Nagler’s (1993) model on deceptive advertising assumed that individuals 
find it difficult  acknowledging that they were deceived as a result of cognitive 
dissonance. Firms have an incentive to deceive because individuals might repeat 
purchasing from a deceiving firm due to this response.  Rabin (1994) showed that 
increasing the level of cognitive dissonance that arises from immoral behavior could 
increase that behavior. He assumed that conformists enjoy immoral behavior yet find it 
difficult to justify such behavior; hence, they suffer from cognitive dissonance because 
their immoral behavior differs from their beliefs. An increase in the level of cognitive   9
dissonance causes immoral behavior to decrease but also causes the person to justify such 
behavior. Because everyone justifies such behavior, the behavior becomes more 
acceptable in society, ultimately causing individuals to increase that immoral behavior. 
Montgomery (1994) assumed that social norms require husbands to provide a minimum 
level of family support and that failure to do so generates cognitive dissonance.  He 
showed that an increase in social norms towards greater family support might decrease 
the level of family support provided by low-income men. 
 
2  The Model  
Consider a society of N individuals; each lives for T periods and allocates 
endowment M in each p eriod between two goods, x and y. The endowment, M, is 
perishable and cannot be saved between periods. Good x is a "psychological good" and 
good y is a normal good. By a psychological good we mean that the individuals display 
cognitive dissonance reactions, a Subjective Minimum Consumption Constraint 
(hereafter SMCC) and are conformist with respect to consumption of that good. 
Consumption of the psychological good is referred to as simply consumption. When we 
refer to consumption of the normal, non-psychological good, we state so explicitly. 
Optimal consumption is chosen according to every individual’s preferences but actual 
consumption is subject to a symmetric random shock and thus volatile around optimal 
consumption. We model cognitive dissonance by assuming that, in each period, 
individuals rationalize their preferences with positive probability. They do so by altering 
their preferences in such a way that actual consumption will be optimal.    10 
Utility from consumption of both psychological and non-psychological goods for 








t x a y x ? . Consumption of the psychological 
good is denoted by 
i
t x  and consumption of the non-psychological good is denoted by 
i
t y . 
An individual preference for the psychological good relative to the non-psychological 
good is denoted by 
i
t a .  
When modeling conformity we assume that an individual's personal consumption, 
i
t x , is influenced by average consumption in society,  t x . The extent of conformity 
relative to other factors that influence the individual is denoted  by d. Average 
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1 . The cost of conformity is represented by 
2 ) ( t
i
t x x d ? . The farther away each individual is from average consumption, the greater 
his utility loss.  
We assume that each individual has a SMCC because individuals become 
accustomed to certain levels of consumption and incur large negative utility if there is a 
sudden large decrease in their consumption level. This negative utility is represented by J, 
which is considered to be prohibitively costly so that no individual will choose to 
consume less than his SMCC. The SMCC at each period, for each individual, is a 
fraction,  ? , of his average optimal consumption in the last s periods. The SMCC takes 
the form
4: 
                                                                   
4 The SMCC can also be a function of actual consumption without introducing a significant change in the 
results. 
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The SMCC is flexible. When consumption is low for several periods, the SMCC will 
decrease although we rule out sudden large decreases in consumption. We assume that 
the random shock does not occur below the SMCC.  
The agent's decision of how much to consume in each period is determined by 
solving the following utility function:  
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Equation (2) has a unique maximization denoted by 
? i
t x , 
? i
t y .  
 
 
Volatility of consumption 
We assume that actual consumption is volatile and distributed uniformly around 
optimal consumption because individuals cannot consume exactly as planned. Individuals 




t M y x ? ? . If x is increased (decreased) due to volatility, y 
will decrease (increase)5. We further assume that individuals adhere to the SMCC.  
Actual consumption will not fall below the SMCC because individuals know that if 
consumption falls, their utility will diminish by a large amount. They are prudent and 
make sure that such an event does not happen. Actual consumption is uniformly 
                                                                   
5 The volatility can also arise from consumption of good y when the good x accommodates.   12 
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We assume uniform distribution in order to simplify the model. The qualitative results 
hold for more general distributions.  
We distinguish between two cases. i) A naive individual optimizes consumption 
based on his utility function regardless of the volatility of actual consumption. ii) A fully 
rational individual would take such volatility into account. We assume that individuals 
are naïve. When individuals are far from their SMCC, a naïve  individual and a fully 
rational one would choose the same consumption level. The naïveté assumption is thus 
crucial only when individuals are close to their SMCC. 
 
LEMMA 1: Both naive and fully rational consumers will consume the same amount when 
actual consumption is distributed uniformly around optimal consumption and the 
individual is far from his SMCC.  
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
   13 
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We assume that individuals know  t x  in period t. They can calculate  t x  if they know the 
utility function of all other individuals.
8 An increase in M can be interpreted as an 
exogenous productivity increase. When M increases and the individual consumes more 
than his  SMCC of x, then both x and y increase. When the SMCC is binding and M 
increases, only y increases.  
                                                                   
6 We elaborate on this in the section on evolution of preferences.  
7 The second-order condition assures maximization. 
8 Knowledge of all individual utility functions is a strong assumption. An alternative assumption is that 
people know how much on average individuals enjoy consumption (know  t a ). A dynamic process evolves 
within each period in which individuals initially consume based on the assumption that no one has reached 
their SMCC. Following that initial consumption level, they increase consumption if other individuals 
reached their SMCC and  t x  is higher than they initially assumed. That increase causes another increase in 
t x  , which initiates yet another increase in each individual's consumption. The process continues until a 
steady state is reached where  t x  and all individual consumption ceases to increase. 
   14 
Evolution of preferences: Rationalization 
We now assume that each individual might alter his preferences in each period 
because of two different reasons. First, with probability  ] 1 , 0 [ ? z  cognitive dissonance 
will occur a nd the individual will alter his preferences in such a way that optimal 
consumption will equal actual consumption. When cognitive dissonance occurs, cd=1; 
when cognitive dissonance does not occur, cd=0. Second, when the SMCC is binding — 
that is, had there not been a SMCC the individual would have consumed less — the 
individual will rationalize his optimal consumption and increase his preference for good 
x9.  We formalize Bowles's (1998) idea that cognitive dissonance can endogenize 
preferences. Preferences  are endogenous because each period's preferences are 
determined by the previous period's consumption. The agent will change his preferences 
in period t by altering 
i
t a 1 ? . Thus 
i
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The first row of equation 5 represents a situation where preferences do not change 
because consumption is not near the SMCC and cognitive dissonance does not occur. The 
second row represents a situation where cognitive dissonance has occurred; the utility 
function is altered in such a way that actual consumption is optimal.  The third row 
                                                                   
9 The qualitative results hold without the second assumption for all z. But we feel that this assumption is 
more natural than leaving preferences unchanged when the SMCC is binding. When cognitive dissonance 
always occurs (z=1), the second assumption regarding rationalization of consumption is redundant because 
the individual always rationalizes actual consumption.    15 
represents a situation where optimal consumption would have fallen below the SMCC 
had there not been an SMCC; the utility function is thus altered in such a way that 
optimal consumption will be optimal regardless of the SMCC.  
We assume that individuals do not take future changes in preferences into account 
when deciding how much to consume. They maximize their consumption in each period 
as if there were no future changes in preferences. Such an assumption is congruent with 
the psychological literature. Cognitive dissonance theory claims that people rationalize 
their actions, it does not claim that people take rationalizations into account. Cognitive 
dissonance is often used to explain irrational or maladaptive behavior. Had people been 
taking cognitive dissonance into account, they would not take initial actions that could 
lead them to such behavior. 
 
Description of the dynamic 
The dynamic works as follows. In each period, each individual chooses optimal 
consumption according to equation (4) subject to the SMCC, which is specified by 
equation (1). His actual consumption is a random variable around optimal consumption, 
specified by equation (3). Preferences change over time as described by (5), thereby 
causing an alteration in his preferences. In the following period, each individual chooses 
optimal consumption once more according to the new preferences; the dynamic then 
repeats itself. Notice that conformity, the propagation mechanism, appears in equation 
(4). Each individual's consumption is affected by society’s average consumption.  
When no individual is near his SMCC, individual consumption of the 
psychological good scatters because individuals rationalize their actions. The probability   16 
that society’s average consumption of the psychological good will increase equals the 
probability that it will decrease. When someone is near his SMCC, the probability of 
rationalizing higher consumption is greater than the probability of rationalizing lower 
consumption.  Thus, the probability that society’s average consumption of the 
psychological good will increase is greater than the probability that it will decrease. 
Because of conformity, once society’s average consumption of the psychological good 
increases, all individuals increase their consumption of that good, causing a further 
increase in society’s average consumption of the psychological good. In the following 
period, all individuals will be quite distant from their SMCC and the dynamic will recur. 
The initial and overall increase in society’s average consumption of the psychological 
good will be greater the more individuals reach their SMCC simultaneously. Such a 
dynamic causes consumption of the psychological good to increase and consumption of 
the non-psychological good to decrease. If we assume exogenous productivity growth in 
each period (the endowment M will increase in each period, causing, other thing being 
equal, both goods to increase), consumption of the non-psychological good will not 
decrease. 
 
RESULT 1: Individuals who have a greater tendency toward conformity will rationalize 
their preferences to a greater degree.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Result 1 holds both when there are individuals near their SMCC and when all individuals 
are far from their SMCC. The SMCC assumption is thus not necessary for this result. The   17 
intuition behind Result 1 is that conformity increases the costs of changing consumption. 
In order to overcome these costs, the conformist individual who wants to change his 
consumption level must rationalize his actions more profoundly to convince himself that 
the change is desirable. That is, the more conformist individuals are, the more they need 
to rationalize their independent choices.  
 
Numerical simulation  
We demonstrate the dynamic using a computer program written in Mathematica 4 that 
simulates how society’s average consumption evolves over time
10. The dynamic is multi 
period with many individuals. In each period, each individual receives a random shock, 
might alter his utility function and is influenced by consumption of others. Using 
numerical simulation we can describe the consumption path of such a complex dynamic. 
 
A cyclical path of consumption growth occurs when during some periods there is a large 
increase in the consumption of x while during other periods, there is a relatively small 
increase or decrease in consumption of x. 
 
A boom in the x market is a relative large increase in average consumption of x.  
 
RESULT 2 : Society’s average consumption of the psychological good will grow in a 
cyclical path when, in each period, each individual in society maximizes consumption 
according to equation (4), actual consumption is distributed around optimal consumption 
and each individual has a cognitive dissonance reaction and rationalizes preferences. 
                                                                   
10 The program files are available from the author by request. 
   18 
Figure 1 demonstrates that society’s average consumption of the psychological 
good evolves in a cyclical path
11. In most periods average consumption of the 
psychological good increases relatively little due to endowment increase, which can be 
interpreted as productivity increase, while in some periods there is a boom in average 
consumption of that good because individuals reach their SMCC. Figure 2 depicts a 
positive correlation between the number of individuals whose consumption is near their 






) and the size of the boom
12. When many individuals are 
near their SMCC, all those individuals are inclined to rationalize for more consumption, 
causing consumption of the psychological good to increase by a relatively large amount. 
The non-psychological good does not decrease because endowment increases in every 
period. When there is no endowment increase, the non-psychological good will decrease 
due to the budget constraint. We do not view this as a deficiency because this chapter is a 
theoretical exercise that examines allocation of consumption between goods. We do not 
examine what happens when the non-psychological good reaches a level where it can no 
longer decrease but assume that either the non-psychological good can be shorted or that 
the endowment is large enough so that it does not reach such a level.  
 
                                                                   
11 Hereinafter, by average consumption we mean the average consumption of all individuals in society.   
12 The program has considerable internal volatility because each individual's consumption is volatile in each 
period. Thus, if run twice for the same parameters, the program's results will differ. The quality or 
magnitude of the results do not differ. Booms occur every time the program is run but not necessarily 
during the same periods.   19 








Figure 1. Average consumption of the psychological good over time for 100 individuals. The 
level of conformity is d=24; cognitive dissonance always occurs, i.e., z=1; volatility of individual 
consumption is r=2; and an individual's initial preference for the psychological good is a=10. The 
SMCC is an average of the previous two periods of consumption. Initial endowment is M=20 and 
M increases by 4 in each period.    20 







Figure 2. Increase in average consumption of the psychological good (boom, the y axis) as a 
function of the percentage of individuals whose optimal consumption is near (less than r) their 
SMCC, corresponding to consumption increases in figure 1. 
 
RESULT 3: Cognitive dissonance and an SMCC can cause average consumption of the 
psychological good to increase without cycles. 
 
Figure 3 shows that average consumption of the psychological good increases without 
cycles when there is no endowment growth and no conformity. The intuition behind the 
result is that when individuals are not conformists, when some individuals reach the 
SMCC and increase consumption, other individuals are unaffected by that increase. 
Hence, average consumption increases only because a fraction of the individuals reached 
their SMCC. During the first two periods average consumption of the psychological good 
does not increase because no individual has yet reached the SMCC.    21 
 









Figure 3: Average consumption of the psychological good increase when the parameters of the 
model are the same as in Figure 1 except that there is no endowment increase and no conformity 
(d=0). 
 
RESULT 4: Average consumption of the psychological good will increase more for a 
group of individuals who display a greater tendency toward conformity.  
 
RESULT 5: A greater number of booms are associated with greater conformity
13. 
  
In order to demonstrate conformity's affect on consumption of the psychological 
good we ran the program 82 times, each time increasing the conformity level. The results 
                                                                   
13 We arbitrarily defined a boom in average consumption as an increase that is at lease twice the average 
increase in society’s average consumption. 
   22 
are summarized in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows that the greater the conformity, the 
larger the overall increase in average consumption of the psychological good after 100 
periods. Figure 5 shows that the higher the conformity level, the more the booms that 
occur. This effect is explained as follows: Given a tendency toward conformity, 
individuals are affected to a greater degree when another's consumption level changes, 
thus increasing both volatility of consumption and the size of the booms. Increasing 
volatility of consumption decreases the time required for individuals to reach their 
SMCC. Conformity also has a negative affect on the number of booms because large 
booms cause more periods to pass until the next boom occurs. But, because the effect of 
greater volatility as an increase in the number of booms dominates, the number of booms 
increases with conformity. 







Figure 4. Average consumption of the psychological good in the final period (after 100 
periods) as a function of conformity (d).   23 








Figure 5. The number of booms as a function of conformity (d). 
 
 
RESULT 6 : Average consumption of the psychological good will increase more for a 
group of individuals who display a greater tendency toward cognitive dissonance. 
 
RESULT 7: A greater number of booms are associated with a greater tendency toward 
cognitive dissonance. 
 
In order to demonstrate the result, we ran the program 41 times. Each time we 
increased the likelihood of cognitive dissonance. The results are summarized in figures 6 
and 7 below. An increase in the likelihood of cognitive dissonance increased the volatility 
of each individual's consumption, decreased the time it took for individuals to reach their 
SMCC and thus increased the group's average consumption of the psychological good 
and number of booms. 
Number of booms   24 








Figure 6: Average consumption of the psychological good in the final period (after 100 
periods) as a function of the probability of experiencing cognitive dissonance (z). 









Figure 7: The number of booms as a function of the probability of experiencin g cognitive 
dissonance (z). 
 
Number of booms   25 
RESULT 8: When endowment growth is low, average consumption of the psychological 
good will increase at a greater rate than average consumption of the non-psychological 
good and cycles will prevail. When endowment growth is high, average consumption of 
both goods will increase at the same pace and cycles will not prevail
14.  
 
In order to demonstrate the result, we ran the program 100 times. Each time we 
increased endowment growth between periods. Figures 8 and 9 show that when 
endowment growth increases, two phenomena occur: First, in the last period, the 
difference between average consumption of the "psychological good" and average 
consumption of the "non-psychological good" decreases. Second, the number of booms 
decreases. The intuition is that when endowment growth is high, consumption of both 
goods increases by a large amount in each period and individuals never reach their 
SMCC. Thus, there are no booms and consumption of both goods increases at the same 
pace. When individuals do reach the SMCC, booms occur and there is an increase in 
consumption of the "psychological good" relative to the "non-psychological good". That 
is, when an exogenous increase in endowment leads to an increase in consumption of the 
psychological good there is less of the internal, psychological increase in consumption of 
that good. 
  
                                                                   
14 A high endowment growth can be interpreted as high productivity growth.    26 







Figure 8: The influence of an endowment increase. The figure shows how the difference between 
the last period's average consumption of the psychological and the non-psychological good 
decreases as the per-period increase in endowment increases.  








Figure 9: The influence of an endowment increase. The figure shows how the number of booms 
decreases as the per-period increase in endowment increases. 
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3  Concluding Remarks 
Allocation of endowment between goods is a decision frequently taken by 
consumers where psychological and economic factors play a role. Cognitive dissonance 
causes people to rationalize past choices. Conformity causes people’s choices to be 
influenced by others. W e assume that conformist individuals rationalize their actions 
following a cognitive dissonance reaction, have a subjective minimum consumption 
constraint and maximize utility function within each period. Preferences are 
endogenously determined by rationalization, causing consumption to scatter over time. 
We show that cyclical growth can be an outcome of such assumptions. Cycles are 
positively correlated to cognitive dissonance and conformity and are negatively 
correlated to exogenous endowment increase. Individuals who have a greater tendency 
toward conformity will rationalize their preferences to a greater degree. 
The model depicts a "consumption rat race", implying that when an individual in 
society increases consumption, this behavior causes everyone else to increase 
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Appendix: 
 
Proof of lemma 1:  
Equation (4) results when individuals are naive. 
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The maximization of the utility function that the agent seeks is at 
? x . Whatever 
? x  the 
decision-maker chooses, his actual consumption will be uniformly distributed around it. 
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The first-order condition: 
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?  is the same as equation (4) when the individual is far from his 
SMCC. The second-order condition assures maximization.  QED 
 
Proof of result 1: An individual's tendency toward conformity is measured by d. The 
extent of rationalization is measured  by the amount of change in 
i
t a  between periods. 
Assume that the rationalization occurs when optimal consumption is greater than the 

















i i x x d a a t t ) 1 ( 2 1 , which increases in d. When the individual optimizes to 
consume the SMCC, his optimal consumption without the SMCC is 
d
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i i x x d a a t t ˆ ) 1 ( 2 1 ? ? ? ?
?
? when the individual rationalizes his optimal consumption 
only. Both increase in d. An increase in conformity, other things being equal, induces to 
an increase in rationalization.  QED 
 
 
 
 